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Abstract 
An easy and popular method for measuring the size of the underground economy 
is to use macro-data such as money demand or electricity demand to infer what 
the legitimate economy needs, and then to attribute the remaining consumption to 
the underground economy. Such inferences rely on the stability of parameters of 
the money demand and electricity demand equations, or at the very least on 
knowledge of how these parameters are changing. We argue that the pace of 
change of these parameters (such as velocity) is too variable in transition 
economies for the above methods of estimating the size of the underground 
economy to be applicable. We make our point by using the Czech Republic and 
other transition country data from the financial and electricity sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2000 Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste published a major survey of how the 
underground economy is measured. Most of the essay gave itself over to analysing macro-
methods for measuring the underground economy. The macro-method roots out the size of the 
underground economy from a functional form in which some observable macro variable depends 
on another observable macro variable and on the unobservable underground economy. The 
researcher infers the size of the underground economy by manipulating the functional form and 
plugging into the observable macro-variables information on their levels. For example, the 
“currency-ratio” method of estimating the underground economy holds that there is a stable ratio 
of currency in the legal economy to demand deposits and that this ratio enters into an equation 
relating the size of the underground economy to the size of the official economy. All one need 
know is the currency ratio in the official economy, then one plugs measured GDP into the above-
mentioned relation, and out pops the size of the underground economy. An undergraduate in a 
first year macroeconomics course could do the exercise in a few minutes. 
Schneider and Enste (2000) as well as many other authors catalogued in a recent OECD (2002) 
handbook on measuring the underground economy are aware of the problems with this method 
of measuring it “on the cheap.” The hunter of the underground economy must be confident that 
the functional relations he postulates between the dependent and independent variables are 
correct, and he has to believe that the parameter estimates with which he rounds out these 
equations (such as the ratio of currency to demand deposits) are accurate and stable. Without 
such assurance the researcher finds himself measuring with a yardstick that changes in 
unpredictable ways. 
What neither Schneider and Enste, nor any other researchers we are aware of for that matter, do 
not emphasize is that the instability of parameters used in macro-methods may be of such size as 
to throw off estimates of the transition underground economies to the point where such estimates 
are nearly useless both as indicators of the absolute size of the underground economy, and, more 
seriously, useless as measures of the change in the size of the underground economy.    3
Transition economies have many of the characteristics of a developed western economy, such as 
high education levels and well-developed infrastructures, but these economies differ from 
developed western economies that they have gone suddenly from state-planning to a free market. 
Unlike underdeveloped economies, which might be quite stable, a transition economy’s 
institutions are in a tumble. We shall review in detail two macro methods of estimating the 
underground sector---the money use and electricity consumption methods---and show that in a 
transition economy these methods are as reliable as trying to predict which way the wind will 
blow. In particular  
1)  Money use methods include the currency demand ratio method and currency demand 
method. Both are virtually useless for transition economies because of intensive financial 
innovation during transition. The number of financial products liable to affect currency 
demand grows at a much greater and more variable pace in transition economies than 
they do in mature western economies.  One is tempted to infer from the huge growth in 
currency demand in the Czech and Slovak Republics in the 1990s that the underground 
economy was booming. We will show that growth in currency demand was related to 
factors that had nothing to do with the underground economy.  
2)  Using electricity consumption to measure the size of the underground economy is fraught 
with difficulties in transition economies where price deregulation and the introduction of 
long-overdue technologies moves electricity demand in ways difficult to attribute to 
underground economy growth.    
 
We shall illustrate the above two critiques of macro methods with data from varying transition 
countries, but principally with reference to the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is an 
interesting case because it can be argued that it has largely finished its transition and thus that the 
last twelve years of its economic history supply us with a completed experiment. We focus on 
the electricity and currency ratio methods because we have assembled detailed information on 
these sectors. Our plan is to lay bare the assumptions underlying the two methods and then to 
show why these assumptions have little value for transition economies.  
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This paper does not pretend to be an exhaustive survey of the validity of all macro methods of 
measuring the underground economy in transition, but we believe the critiques we level at the 
electricity and currency ratio methods may be extended to other macro methods.  
 
2. Electricity as a Measure of the Underground Economy 
The electricity method of measuring the underground economy holds that the underground 
economy can be measured by using a single economic indicator, namely, electricity 
consumption. Daniel Kaufman and Aleksandr Kaliberda (1996) are prominent champions of this 
method, though as Schneider and Enste (2000) point out Lizerri(1979) was already using this 
method. To measure the size of the underground economy in the Ukraine and other FSU 
countries, Kaufman and Kaliberda began with the assumption (based on previous studies of the 
Soviet economy) that in 1989, most of these countries had an underground sector of 12% of 
GDP. They also assume that electricity consumption reacts with unit elasticity to economic 
growth. If an economy had GDP of $100 billion in 1989, then it had an underground economy 
worth $12 billion. If electricity consumption economy grew 10% in the next year this must mean 
the true economy grew by ten 10%. So the true economy’s size would be $123.2 billion in 1990. 
One would then subtract government estimates of the official economy to get at underground 
economy size as it was in 1990. To better see this consider Table 1 which is a reproduction of 
Table 3 in Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996): 
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Table 1: Ukraine’s Electricity Consumption (as proxy of Overall GDP) and Official GDP---
1989-94 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Growth rate in electricity 
consumption    0.0% -2.2% -6.2% -7.8%  -11.7% 
Estimate growth rate in overall 
GDP    0.0% -2.2% -6.2% -7.8%  -11.7% 
Overall GDP index 
100.0  100.0  97.8 91.7 84.6 74.7 
Official GDP index 
88.8 84.5 73.2 60.4 51.4 38.8 
Source: Page 12 in Kaufman and Kalibera (1996) 
  
Based on the assumption that 12% of the economy is underground, Kaufman and Kaliberda find 
in the first column and last row of their table that official GDP index is 88. In 1990 the economy 
registered no change in electricity consumption, so that overall GDP should not have changed 
either. This is why the second row of their table mimics the first row. The difference between 
overall GDP (row 3) and official GDP (row 4) gives an idea of the size of the underground 
economy. By assuming a constant unitary elasticity between electricity consumption and GDP, 
Kaufman and Kaliberda estimated that by 1994 the underground economy had grown to 48.5% 
of official GDP (the difference between the overall GDP index in 1994 and the official index, 
divided by the overall index).  
The ponderous nature of assuming a constant and identical elasticity for all the countries studied 
led Kaufman and Kaliberda to vary their assumptions about the unit elasticity relation between 
electricity and output by considering two scenarios. The conservative scenario held that CEE 
countries had in the upswing of their economies a 0.9 elasticity, the Baltics had unit elasticity, 
and the rest of the FSU states had an elasticity of 1.15 in the upswing of their economies. In their 
overall conservative scenario Kaufman and Kaliberda assumed that except for the Baltics, every 
transition country studied managed every year to decrease energy consumption by 5% for every   6
unit of good produced. The assumption of increasing efficiency was meant to account for a 
decreasing output of elasticity over time and so give the appearance that the authors have taken 
into account the dynamic context of energy consumption in transition economies.  
 
A variant on the Kaufmann-Kaliberda method that has gained popularity in recent years is that of 
Maria Lacko (2000). Lacko also takes electric power consumption as a physical indicator of 
economic activity, but she focuses on household consumption of electricity, as she believes that 
household production is the major source of underground activity and that this activity is closely 
related to overall underground activity. She uses a two-stage regression technique (which we will 
describe later in the present paper) that relies on the assumption of a stable relationship between 
energy use and the underground economy in order to get an estimate of the underground 
economy’s size.  
In Table 2 we present Johnson, Kaufmann, and Schleifer (1997) as well as Lacko’s estimates of 
the underground economy for four similar transition economies.  
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Table 2: Available estimates of the informal sector size for different methods 
Period  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Method  Source 
6.7  12.9 16.9 16.9 17.6 11.3 Electricity  consumption  JKS  1997 
Czech 
Republic 
15.2  19.9  15.4   Household electricity 
consumption  L 2000 
28  32.9 30.6 28.5 27.7  29  Electricity  consumption  JKS  1997 
Hungary 
26.7  34.8   31    Household electricity 
consumption  L 2000 
19.6 23.5 19.7 18.5 15.2 12.6 Electricity  consumption  JKS  1997 
Poland 
30.8   33   32.8   Household electricity 
consumption  L 2000 
7.7  15.1 17.6 16.2 14.6  5.8  Electricity  consumption  JKS  1997 
Slovakia 
 11.2  14.7  22.3   Household electricity 
consumption  L 2000 
Note: JKS stands for Johnson, Kaufmann, and Schleifer, and L stands for Lacko.  
 
The table above documents that various methods yield diverse results. The variation in the 
estimates for the electricity consumption method and the Lacko method for the Czech Republic 
amounts to as much as 8.5%, which represents a 120% difference between the estimates. 
Time consistency does not hold either. For Slovakia the first method estimates a decreasing 
evolution of informal sector activities between 1992 and 1995, whereas the second method 
shows an increasing size.  
The differences in estimates consequently yield different rankings of the countries by estimated 
informal sectors. Table 3 below summarizes the discrepancies. 
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Table 3: Ranking by size of informal sector for two methods of estimation 
  Country  1990 1992 1994 Method  Source 
Czech 
Republic 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
Electricity consumption 
Household el. consumption 
JKS 1997 
L1997 
Hungary 
3 
2 
4 
4 
4 
3 
Electricity consumption 
Household el. consumption 
JKS 1997 
L1997 
Poland 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
Electricity consumption 
Household el. consumption 
JKS 1997 
L1997 
Slovakia 
N/A 
N/A 
2 
1 
1 
2 
Electricity consumption 
Household el. consumption 
JKS 1997 
L1997 
  
The unsettling features of these electricity methods can be summarized as follows: 
•  Different variants of the method produce significantly different quantitative results for 
individual estimates.  
•  For an individual country the time trend of the estimated size of the informal economy differs 
for different methods used (see the Czech Republic).  
•  Comparing the rankings of countries produced by different methods we find that the 
qualitative results of different methods also vary significantly. 
Even if there were no sign of contradictions in electricity measures of the underground economy 
we believe this method’s assumptions are unrealistic for transition economies. 
 The most objectionable feature of electricity methods is that they postulate either a one-to-one 
relation between electricity consumption and GDP, or a stable relationship between electricity 
consumption and GDP, or in more sophisticated applications of these methods, such as Kaufman 
and Kaliberda (1996), the assumption that there is a steady rise in the efficient use of electricity 
so that the output elasticity of electricity consumption is decreasing at a constant rate.    9
The one-to-one or constant relationship between electricity use and GDP is a stylized-fact 
gleaned from developed economies where there is a stable sectoral composition of GDP. Each 
sector has its specific electricity demand for every $1 of GDP the sector produces. Developed 
economies have not known the sort of price fluctuation and massive restructuring of energy-use 
technologies that economies in transition have known.  
 
In spite of Kaufman and Kaliberda’s faith in their assumptions, a glance at some easily available 
macro-data from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia makes evident that the 
electricity method’s assumption of a stable relationship between GDP and electricity use does 
not apply to transition economies.  
Table 4 below shows that in transition each of the named economies’ total, and primary sector 
energy use fell radically and in irregular leaps during the 1990s whereas measures for the EU, 
the OECD, and the US show almost no change in these energy uses. Energy use fell in the 
transition countries listed in Table 3 because these countries decided to move away from their 
communist heritage of heavy industrial production. For example, between 1990 and 1997 iron 
and steel production in the Czech Republic fell from 21 million tons to six million tons. The drop 
in industrial production in turn lowered demand for railway transport, which was heavily 
dependent on electricity. For example, in the Czech Republic in 1990 railways transported 170 
billion tons of goods whereas trucks carried 173 billion tons. In 2001 railways were carrying 
only 97 billion tons while trucks were carrying 440 billion tons.  
Overall energy use will be correlated with electricity use, so that the challenge these numbers 
pose for the Kaufmann-Kaliberda method is that in such a shifting environment it is hard to 
pretend that there is a stable one-to-one relationship between GDP and electricity use or that 
there was a constant change in this relationship. Instead one must recognize that there was a 
highly variable reduction in the share of total electricity consumption going to the primary 
sector.   
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Even if electricity methods had correct information on the output elasticity of electricity 
consumption they would face a further challenge to their validity. Electricity methods 
rest on the assumption that changes in electricity consumption reflect changes in the 
overall growth of the economy. It is quite possible for electricity consumption to change 
for reasons that have nothing to do with output changes. Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996) 
recognize the problem and explain that these reasons for electricity consumption change 
fall into two negatively correlated categories that offset each other in biasing estimates 
of the underground economy. In the category of downward bias, consider that if an 
economy is changing its output-mix by moving from the primary to the secondary 
sector, electricity consumption will decline with no overall change in output. One might 
then wrongly infer that the underground economy has shrunk. We might be led into a 
similar bias if electricity prices are increasing relative to other energy prices, and if 
industry is becoming more efficient at using electricity. Factors that could bias estimates 
of the underground economy upward are the substitution of electricity for other sources, 
such as natural gas as well as higher overhead and fixed electricity use during an 
economic downswing.  A glance at each of the listed items shows that they could belong 
to either category. If electricity prices are falling, then this factor should be taken out of 
the downward bias category and put into the upward bias category. If the output mix is 
shifting more towards the primary sector then it too should be placed into the upward 
bias category. One can play this logic game to show that all factors listed above might, 
under the right circumstances, be lumped into just one category. In such a case there 
would be no negative correlation between categories upon which Kaufman and 
Kaliberda could base their hope of producing estimates of the underground economy 
that are unbiased. An example from the Czech Republic that considers household 
electricity consumption and industry efficiency in electricity use shows that bias will 
exist and will exist in shifting directions.  
 
Table 5 shows that in the Czech Republic, sometimes the price of electricity relative to 
natural gas and other sources rose and sometimes it fell. No stable pattern can be 
gleaned.  
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Table 5 
Growth rate (in percent) of household price indexes in the Czech Republic 
 
Indexes  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Electricity  69.7 0.0  5.1  9.0 12.0  14.8  15.3  44.1 0.0 15.1 
Natural  gas  126.7 0.0  6.5  10.0 10.5 15.2 15.2 47.6  0.0  15.1 
Other heating 
(coal, etc.)  216.1 3.2  25.5 16.5 17.3 10.3 34.4 22.0  2.9  4.3 
Source: Czech Statistical Office, Authors’ computations 
The unstable pattern in prices combined with changes in household production 
technologies to change demand for electricity in patterns that would have been hard to 
predict. During the early 1990s, citizens of the Czech Republic converted en masse 
from heating with domestic coal ovens to heating with gas and electricity. Czechs also 
began to invest heavily in durables such as refrigerators, washing machines, 
dishwashers, televisions, and home computers. These upgrades to domestic life may 
account for part of the rise in household consumption of electricity during the transition 
period. The steep rise in electricity prices in 1997 may account for the downward trend 
in electricity consumption later on. So in the early years electricity prices would have 
belonged to the upward bias category and in later years to the downward bias category.  
 
Now consider industry efficiency. During transition Czech industry was rapidly finding 
new ways of reducing its energy consumption by adopting innovative production 
techniques. Table 6 shows that even though Czech electricity output was increasing, 
noxious emissions plummeted.  
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Table 6 
Waste and electricity production 
 
Year SO2 
(kT) 
NOx 
(kT) 
CO 
(kT) 
Dust 
(kT) 
Production of 
Electricity (TWh) 
1980 2148 731 894 1267 53 
1985 2161 795 899 1015 58 
1990 1876 742 891 631 63 
1991 1776 725 1101 592 61 
1992 1538 698 1045 501 59 
1993 1419 574 967 441 59 
1994 1278 434 1026 355 59 
1995 1091 412 874 201 61 
1996 946 432 886 179 64 
1997 700 423 877 128 65 
1998 443 413 767 86 65 
1999 269 390 686 67 65 
2000 266 400 650 56 73 
2001 251 332 649 54 74 
Source: Czech Statistical Office, Ministry of Environment 
The noxious emissions noted above come from electricity generation and industrial 
production. Part of the dive in pollution came from the Czech parliament’s adoption of 
EU environmental regulations far ahead of the prescribed deadlines. It might be argued 
that environmental compliance leads to less efficient methods of producing electricity, 
but this ignores that in the period above the Czech Republic transformed itself into a net 
exporter of electricity. Industry was producing more output with less electricity. 
Increases in energy efficiency were continuous and would have biased underground 
economy calculations downward. When we combine this observation with the 
observation on household electricity demand we get both effects negating each other at 
first and negating each other later. The point is that we cannot blithely assume all forces 
governing electricity consumption will cancel the bias with which each threatens 
estimates of the underground economy.  
Maria Lacko’s (2000) estimates of the underground economy using household 
electricity consumption are subject to the same critiques that apply to Kaufman and 
Kaliberda’s (1996) estimates, even though both methods seem miles apart. As 
mentioned earlier, Lacko examines a times series of cross sections of transition 
countries and postulates a regression between the size of the underground economy 
(which she calls H) and independent variables such as tax rates, level of government  
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spending, and number of people above 14 living in households. She also postulates a 
regression in which the size of the underground economy is an independent variable in a 
regression explaining household electricity consumption.
2 She then estimates the 
electricity regression and attributes that part of the dependent variable explained by her 
substitution from the H equation as being the size of the underground economy. Quite 
apart from the question of whether she has correctly formulated the H equation, her 
estimates rely on the assumption of stable regression estimates: that is, she is assuming 
that the manner in which people use electricity does not change. Our critique of the 
Kaufman-Kaliberda (1996) method was based on the overwhelming prevalence of such 
changes.  
By not taking into account the changing reasons for electricity consumption that have 
nothing to do with underground economy growth, electricity methods produce estimates 
of the underground economy that have nothing to do with hidden economic activity. 
Efforts to explain the size of the underground economy using data that “code” irrelevant 
forces into the underground economy estimates can lead to absurd results such as the 
one we present in Table 7 with data taken from Eliat and Zinnes (2002). Put differently, 
false assumptions used to divine the size of the underground economy cause estimates 
of the shadow economy to be correlated with omitted factors, such as shifts in the 
weather.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Her  trick for getting estimates of H is to substitute the right hand side of the H regression, which consists of measurable variables 
and parameters that can be estimated as proxies for H, in the right hand side of the electricity regression.  
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Table 7  
Explaining the share of the shadow economy by average winter temperature and relative 
changes (compared to EU level using PPP prices) for Visegrad countries 
 
Share of shadow economy on GDP   
Plain OLS  Plain 
OLS 
Plain OLS in 
differences  
(~ Fixed effects) 
Average temperature in winter months (January-
March, November to December)  
2.90
*** 
(0.89) 
1.33 
(0.83) 
-1.53*** 
(0.40) 
Ratio of total final energy consumption using 
1990 prices (PPP) to EU level 
 -29.29
*** 
(7.47) 
7.34  
(8.60) 
Constant 19.26
*** 
(2.11) 
82.01
*** 
(16.08) 
 
Number of observations  30  30  26 
R-squared 0.27  0.54  0.39 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
* significant on 10% level, ** significant on 5% level, *** significant on 1% level 
 
 
The dependent variable is the underground economy estimated using electricity methods 
and the data come from the Czech Republic between 1990-1997, Hungary between 
1990-1997, Poland between 1990-1996, and Slovakia between 1990-1996. Three 
categories of independent variables should appear in the right hand side of the above 
regression. As we discussed, electricity consumption will depend on weather, 
technological progress, and different patterns of price liberalization. If these forces are 
mistakenly subsumed in underground economy estimates based on electricity methods, 
we should find them significant in a regression in which these forces appear as variables 
explaining the size of the underground economy.  
 
 We were not able to get any variable that could be used as a cross-country consistent 
proxy for price liberalization in the energy sector, and so we used only two factors, 
average winter temperature, and a proxy for technological progress in electricity 
consumption (ratio of total final energy consumption using 1990 prices (PPP) to the EU 
level) to explain the size of the underground economy (the R-squared of our regressions 
suggests that even these two factors explain a great deal of variation in the underground 
economy).  
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The first and second columns of Table 7 refer to OLS estimation of the share of the 
shadow economy as a percent of GDP, as a function of average winter temperatures and 
as a proxy for technological progress in electricity consumption (the ratio of total final 
energy consumption using 1990 prices (PPP) to the EU level). Even when we ignore 
country effects, each of the factors we include could explain about 27 and 54 percent of 
the total variation, respectively. Results become even more striking if we take into 
account particular country effects and run a model (third column) in which we regress 
year-to-year increases in the share of the shadow economy on year-to-year changes in 
winter temperature, and on changes in the above discussed proxy for technological 
progress in the electricity sector. Column 3 clearly indicates that increases in macro 
estimates of the shadow economy are very well explained by decreases in average 
winter temperature. In other words, the regressions above show that weather 
fluctuations explain a significant part of the variation in the size of the underground 
economy, estimated via the electricity macro method. Such results suggest that 
electricity macro estimates of the underground economy should not be taken seriously.  
 
In summary, because of the shifting reasons for electricity demand none of the 
electricity methods we have described above holds much promise for giving us an idea 
of the size of the underground economy, and more seriously of giving us an idea of how 
this economy is changing. As we shall see in the next section, similar critiques cripple 
monetary approaches to measuring the underground economy in transition economies.  
 
3. Monetary Approach - Currency Ratio and Currency Demand Methods 
As mentioned earlier, researchers have applied the currency ratio and money demand 
methods to measure the size of the informal sector. Almost all these studies, however, 
focus either on developing countries or on developed countries. We are aware of no 
single study which would have used currency methods to estimate the size of the 
underground economy in transition countries. Perhaps researchers are aware of the 
weakness of currency methods, or perhaps they have not got around to applying this 
method to transition economies. Whatever their reasons, we believe such an effort 
would be as misplaced as are efforts to measure the size of the underground economy  
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by electricity methods. To understand our misgivings about currency methods we must 
first have a look at how they work.  
The currency ratio method, whose current popularity can be dated back to Gutmann 
(1977), measures the size of the underground economy by starting with the following 
simple relationship  
D C
C
Y
Y
O
I
O
I
+
=  
Where YI represents total output of the informal sector, YO output of the official sector 
(O and I subscripts denote “official” and “informal”), C denotes total currency (i.e. 
C=CO+CI), and D=DO denotes total demand deposits equal to demand deposits in the 
official economy since the method assumes that in an informal economy there are no 
transactions in demand deposits. What the above equation says is that the ratio of the 
size of the informal to the formal economy is equal to the ratio of the monies used in 
either economy. No demand deposits appear in the informal economy because of the 
lack of a banking sector there. The problem in getting at the size of the informal 
economy from the above equation is that we have no information on how currency is 
divided between the sectors. We can play with the above equation to give the following: 
D D k
D k C
Y Y
O
O
O I +
−
=  
where k0  is the ratio of currency in the official economy C0 to demand deposits D in the 
official economy. Notice what this transformation has achieved. We know total 
currency C and demand deposits D, as we know the size of the official economy Y0. All 
we need to get at YI from the above equation is an estimate of k0. In order to obtain 
estimate of k0 one has to assume that in some initial period the size of the informal 
economy is zero, and therefore that observed total currency equals currency in the 
official sector. Such an assumption allows us to calculate k0 in the initial period. We 
then assume that this ratio is constant for the years that follow.  
Guttman’s currency ratio-method has a close ally in Tanzi’s (1983) currency-demand 
method. The essence of this method is to estimate a money demand equation using 
conventional variables and to include variables that would be related to the underground  
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economy, such as the level of taxes and the complexity of the tax system. One then 
calculates the percentage of variation in money demand explained by these non-
conventional variables in order to get at how much money is being used by the 
underground economy---a technique very similar in spirit to the one Lacko (2000) uses 
in her electricity method. To get at the size of the underground economy one then 
multiplies this underground money demand by the velocity of money. Here the key 
assumptions are of a constant velocity of money and of proper specification of the 
money demand equation.  
Both currency methods described above have problems that parallel electricity methods. 
The assumption of a base year when the size of the underground economy was known, 
combined with the assumption of the constancy of some parameter seem like deja vu 
from the research of Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Lacko (2000).  
Is there a base year for any transition economy, in which we have data on currency and 
demand deposits in an economy without an informal sector? The answer is an 
unequivocal “no.” Researchers are frank about this limitation of the currency ratio 
method and see it as a major obstacle to measuring the level of the informal sector. 
Problems of estimating the informal sector using money-methods are compounded 
when we consider that the currency-demand deposit ratio and velocity are bound to be 
very unstable for transition economies.  Instability in money demand is due to catch-up 
effects in the banking sector of transition economies. Many previously non-existent 
financial services and products find their way to market in a brief time. The pace of 
financial innovation may be much higher (though the level is no more advanced) than in 
developed economies. Financial innovation can destabilize money demand as these 
forces interfere with the motives for holding cash. To see this more clearly, consider the 
following. In the pre-transition period a handful of state-owned savings and loans type 
banks made up the banking sector. Due to a lack of competition the scope of banking 
services was very limited. Following transition foreign banks entered financial markets 
and introduced competition. Competition narrows the gap between the level of financial 
services provided in transition and developed economies. Obviously, some products 
such as cheques were never introduced in transition countries, as they were already 
outdated and superceded by credit and debit cards.    
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Money demand in transition countries can also change for the following reasons: 
1)  A lack of credit is a feature of early transition economies and forces people to 
hold cash. As credit widens (see Table 8 showing the growth in credit cards), 
cash holdings fall. There is also a commercial side to the instability in money 
demand. Bank failures during transition can force agents to change their cash-
holding strategies towards holding increasing amounts of cash. At the same time 
transition economies experience great ups and downs in taxes. These taxes will 
in turn move people to transact in cash to avoid their obligations to government.  
Table 8: 
Year-to-year increases in the number of EC and MC (credit&debit cards) 
 
Countries  96/95 97/96 98/97 99/98 00/99 
Czech  Rep.  58% 48% 33% 29%  129% 
Hungary 149%  85%  70%  30%  24% 
Poland 467%  143% 76% 153% 54% 
Slovakia  31% 22% 13% 54% 31% 
Total  EC/MC  15% 18% 20% 13% 13% 
Source: EC and MC statistics, authors’ computation 
 
2)  At times the real interest rate was negative in several transition countries, 
including in the Czech Republic. A negative interest rate can force people out of 
demand deposits into cash holdings.  
3)  Artis and Lewis (1984) argue that in the UK in 1974, due to changes in banking 
regulations brought about by the Competition and Credit Control Act, the 
currency to demand deposit ratio changed in ways that are hard to measure. The 
same must be true of transition countries where regulations were in greater flux 
than they were in the UK.   Many transition countries changed their regulations 
quite frequently, slowly introducing deposit insurance (with changed upper 
limits for the amount insured). A prominent example is the change in the   
minimum reserve requirements in the Czech Republic as Table 9 shows:  
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Table 9: 
Czech Republic minimum reserve requirement rates 1992-2002 
 
Rates (percent) effective by:    
   10/92 2/93
* 7/93 8/94 8/95 8/96 5/97 8/98  1/99  10/99
Demand 
deposits 
9  9-12  9  12  8.5 11.5 9.5  7.5  5  2 
Time 
deposits 
3  3-4  3  12  8.5 11.5 9.5  7.5  5  2 
 
* Lower rate was used for banks with deposits up to 25 billion CZK, otherwise the higher rate was 
applied. Source: CNB, Monetary indicators. 
 
 
4)  Almost all transition countries succumbed to banking crises in the 1990s. The 
loss and return of depositor confidence was bound to at first raise, and then 
depress the currency to demand deposit ratio in ways that are hard to measure. 
We can state that during two years (starting in the second half of 1995, ending in 
1997) Czech banks saw an exodus of deposits, which can be attributed to a lack 
of trust in banks, after several bank failures. After several central bank 
interventions, the credit of banks was restored, and withdrawn money appeared 
in deposits again (giving an enormous rise in annual savings ratios in 1997 or 
early 1998). 
To get a feeling for the volatility of currency to demand deposit ratios, consider Figure 1 
and Table 10.  The pattern of currency to demand deposit ratios is strikingly diverse for 
the transition countries. Whereas in the Czech and Slovak Republics the ratio increases 
with time, in Hungary and Poland the time trend is ambiguous. In the case of Poland the 
ratio is significantly volatile. In contrast, the figures for France and Canada, countries 
that are out of their transitions, are very stable. This supports the argument against the 
applicability of the macro method to transition economies. Especially in case of 
Hungary and Poland it is clear that volatility in the currency to demand ratio is not 
explainable alone by a surge in the informal sector but rather by shocks in the monetary 
and financial sectors.  
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Special attention should go to trends in the Czech and Slovak Republics.  The time 
trends of both countries seem to be very close to each other, with a shock in Slovakia in 
1995, which caused a temporary decrease of cash usage. In 1995 Slovakia introduced 
officially monitored cash registers in order to eliminate tax evasion and consequently 
fatten state coffers. Such a regulatory change is likely to show up as a temporarily lower 
demand for cash while participants in the informal economy accommodate this shock.  
Figure 1: 
Currency to demand ratios, Visegrad countries, France and Canada 
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Table 10: 
Currency to demand deposits ratio (in percentage points) 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Czech 
Republic          29.2 27.2 33.5 37.5 39.9 46.1 54.7 52.6 44.8 
Hungary  94.2 70.1 76.6 67.7 72.4 74.1 79.0 68.1 58.5 59.7 67.0 59.2 59.7 
Poland  114.4 72.7 109.9 109.9 103.4 80.9 109.6 82.1  79.2  72.9  76.2  70.5  73.6 
Slovakia          27.7 29.6 30.5 33.6 41.8 51.4 60.1 56.4 56.0 
Source: IFS database. [C=currency outside domestic banks]  
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Conclusion 
Measuring the underground economy is one of the last great frontiers of economics. 
This is not a bold statement, but rather, a lament. Nearly a thousand years ago the 
Norman conquerors of England did away with the Danegeld and replaced it with a tax 
based on the Domesday book. The “book” was a catalogue of the tax base of England. 
The Domesday book is, in the minds of the authors of the present work, one of the 
reasons for which England grew to be a powerful and just nation. A proper 
measurement of the tax base allows governments to distribute evenly and efficiently the 
burden for financing public projects. Economies in transition have no Norman 
conquerors that would insist on establishing an efficient system of taxation. There can 
be no will to spread taxes evenly if there is no reliable measure of who pays taxes and 
who evades these taxes.  
 
“Macro” measures of tax evasion suffer two flaws. They do not finger who it is that 
evades, and they do not provide a consistent and reasonable estimate of the magnitude 
of evasion. Economists understand that everything has a price and that talk is cheap. 
Macro estimates of the underground economy are cheap talk. An undergraduate student 
wishing to finish his term paper on tax evasion can, using macro techniques, trot out 
estimates of the underground economy with a few keystrokes on his computer. We hope 
to have shown that macro estimates of the underground economy rely on assumptions 
that are questionable for mature economies and unrealistic for transition economies.  
 
Our critique is not original. Practitioners of macro-methods for estimating the 
underground economy understand that their estimates rely on the realism of their model 
and on the constancy of their assumptions about key parameters in their model. We 
have shown that assumptions about key parameters in macro models, such as the 
velocity of money and the structure of electricity demand, are improbable for mature 
economies, they are positively impalpable for transition economies. Measuring the size 
of the underground economy in transition economies may be an impossible task, but 
measuring how it changes may be feasible by using panel studies that yearly ask people 
about what they believe is the size of the underground economy and whether or not they 
in engage in underground economic activities.   
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